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Abstract
It is widely known that individuals have a tendency to imitate each other. However, different
psychological disciplines assess imitation in different manners. While social psychologists
assess mimicry by means of action observation, cognitive psychologists assess automatic
imitation with reaction time based measures on a trial-by-trial basis. Although these meth-
ods differ in crucial methodological aspects, both phenomena are assumed to rely on similar
underlying mechanisms. This raises the fundamental question whether mimicry and auto-
matic imitation are actually correlated. In the present research we assessed both phenom-
ena and did not find a meaningful correlation. Moreover, personality traits such as empathy,
autism traits, and traits related to self- versus other-focus did not correlate with mimicry or
automatic imitation either. Theoretical implications are discussed.
Introduction
Individuals imitate a wide range of different behaviors including facial expressions [1], charac-
teristics of language [2–5], emotions [1,6], postures [7], gestures [8], complex action patterns
[9] or simple movements [10–14]—to name just a few examples. Research from the last decade
suggests that imitative behavior may function as a “social glue” (e.g., [15,16]) in the sense that
it strengthens human bonds by increasing pro-social behavior [17], feelings of affiliation [18],
or liking for each other [6].
Within the domain of imitation, social psychologists are applying different paradigms than
cognitive psychologists. With reference to the chameleon effect, social psychologists investigate
mimicry—individuals’ tendency to imitate others in social settings. Mimicry has most often
been investigated by applying naturalistic paradigms that measure the frequency of imitation
in interactions between a participant and a confederate (e.g., [6,16,19–22]). For example, Char-
trand and Bargh [6] let participants engage in a card-sorting task with a confederate who
repeatedly touched his face in one half of the experiment and repeatedly waggled his food in
the other half of the experiment. Importantly, participants’ behavior was videotaped during
the experiment so that the researchers could code how often participants engaged themselves
in face touching and food waggling. The typical result of such a paradigm is that participants
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more often touch their face than waggle their foot when the confederate touches his face and
vice versa when the confederate waggles his foot. Besides such one-to-one interactions,
researchers have also used adapted versions (e.g., [11–13,18,21,22,23,24–27]) in which partici-
pants observe a video of a model who engages in two classes of different behaviors (e.g., nose
touching vs. hair touching). Similar to the aforementioned studies, participants are videotaped
while they watch the videos. Afterwards, coders measure the degree of mimicry by coding how
often participants performed the two target actions themselves.
In contrast to such naturalistic paradigms, researchers in cognitive psychology focus on
automatic imitation, which can be seen as the laboratory model of imitation [28]. In a typical
experiment, participants respond over many trials with two different movements to two differ-
ent symbolic cues while seeing a congruent movement, an incongruent movement, or no
movement on a computer screen. For example, in the task developed by Brass, Bekkering, and
Prinz [10], participants have to lift their index or middle finger in response to the number ‘1’
or ‘2’. At the same time, participants also see a hand performing either the same finger move-
ment (i.e. congruent), the other finger movement (i.e. incongruent), or no finger movement
(i.e. neutral). Automatic imitation in this paradigm refers to the finding that individuals
respond faster and with fewer errors to congruent trials than to incongruent trials (i.e., congru-
ency effect). However, besides the congruency effect, researchers can also compute the facilita-
tion effect—individuals’ tendency to respond faster and with fewer errors to congruent trials
than to neutral trials. Finally, the experimental setup allows measuring individuals’ tendency
to inhibit imitative responses (i.e., interference effect). That is, individuals respond slower and
with more errors to incongruent trials than to neutral trials (e.g., [10,29]).
In the literature, the terms mimicry and automatic imitation are often used synonymously
[28]. Thus, there seems to be wide agreement that mimicry and automatic imitation are corre-
lated. But is this indeed the case? The answer to this fundamental question may depend on
whether one compares the methods or the theoretical assumptions of mimicry and automatic
imitation. While a methodological analysis suggests that the two paradigms measure different
constructs, a theoretical analysis instead points towards a common ground.
Methodological differences between mimicry and automatic imitation
Paradigms on mimicry and automatic imitation differ in many methodological aspects (for an
overview see Table 1). First, mimicry tasks have higher ecological validity than automatic imi-
tation tasks, because mimicry, but not automatic imitation, assesses imitation in natural set-
tings (cf. [28]). Second, the two tasks differ in terms of dependent variables. That is, paradigms
on automatic imitation measure responses in the form of reaction times and error rates to con-
gruent and incongruent observed movements on a trial-by-trial basis. In mimicry paradigms,
however, researchers count how often participants engage in a certain behavior within a prede-
fined time period and then calculate a sum score that indicates how often the confederate was
imitated. Third, the two imitation paradigms differ in the degree to which participants become
aware about the effect. Mimicry effects remain unaware for participants (cf. [30]). That is, in
Table 1. Differences between mimicry and automatic imitation tasks.
Task characteristics Mimicry Automatic imitation
Ecological validity high low
Dependent variable Subjective ratings of executed actions Reaction times and error rates
Awareness low high
Cognitive control low high
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0183784.t001
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posttest interviews, participants usually report no awareness of the model’s focal behavior (e.g.,
nose touching), no awareness of an intention to mimic, and no awareness that they mimicked
the confederate’s behavior (e.g., [6]). In contrast, in automatic imitation paradigms more con-
scious awareness seems to be involved. Although it has not yet been empirically tested, it is our
experience that participants are well aware that the other person’s finger movements influence
their performance. Fourth, the two paradigms differ in the psychological processes needed to
work on the task. While automatic imitation tasks need explicit cognitive control and execu-
tive functioning (e.g., [31]), mimicry tasks need less explicit cognitive control because mimicry
is unconsciously driven and no actions need to be suppressed [6].
Theoretical similarities between mimicry and automatic imitation
Although the paradigms used in research on mimicry and automatic imitation differ in several
aspects, there are also important similarities with regard to the theoretical assumptions and
moderators of mimicry and automatic imitation.
Theoretical assumptions. Irrespective of how imitation is assessed, it is generally agreed
that automatic imitation and mimicry are both based on shared representations of observed
and executed actions. For example, ideomotor theory [32–35]—a theory shaped in cognitive
psychology—proposes that the visual image of an action is part of its motor representation. As
a result, the observation of a certain action primes the execution of the same action. A similar
proposition can be derived from research on mimicry, which puts forward the so-called per-
ception–behavior link [6,36–38]. This link implies that the observation of an action evokes
the same representation as the execution of that action. This common representation then
increases the likelihood of the execution of the perceived action. Regardless of its framing, the
idea that the observation of an action leads to the activation of the corresponding motor plan
in the observer has now been confirmed extensively in behavioral studies (e.g., [10,29,39,40]),
fMRI studies (e.g., [41,42]), motor TMS studies (e.g., [43,44]), and single-cell recordings in
both monkeys [45] as well as humans [46].
Moderating influences. Past research on moderating influences suggests that similar fac-
tors facilitate mimicry and automatic imitation. For example, research has repeatedly found
that empathy positively correlates with different kinds of imitation paradigms [47–49]. Other
research suggests that the link between empathy and imitation is specific to a subfactor of
empathy—namely perspective taking. In this respect, it has been shown that watching actions
from the first-person perspective increases imitation as compared to the third-person perspec-
tive [12,50,51]. Similarly, when assessing perspective taking as a personality trait with the
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; [52]), research found that the ability to take another per-
son’s perspective increases mimicry [6,53] as well as automatic imitation [54, 55].
Another often reported facilitator of imitation is the degree to which individuals focus on
others as compared to themselves. To explore the role of self-construal [56], it has been tested
whether individuals who perceive themselves as dependent on others (i.e., interdependent self-
construal) imitate others more strongly than individuals who perceive themselves as unique
individuals (i.e., independent self-construal). For example, van Baaren, Maddux, Chartrand,
De Bouter, and van Knippenberg [57] found that priming an interdependent, as compared to
an independent self-construal, increases mimicry. Moreover, the authors demonstrated that
individuals from eastern societies, who are known for their interdependent self-construal,
mimic others more strongly than individuals from western societies, who are known for their
independent self-construal. Similar findings have been found in research on automatic imita-
tion. Hogeveen and Obhi [58], for instance, used the same priming as van Baaren and col-
leagues and found larger congruency effects following an interdependent self-construal
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manipulation, as compared to an independent self-construal manipulation. Relatedly, research
has found reduced automatic imitation effects when increasing the self-focus of participants
by letting them sit in front of a mirror [59].
Another moderator that has been investigated is autism. For example, Cook, Swapp, Pan,
Bianchi-Berthouze and Blakemore [60] found reduced automatic imitation effects in individu-
als with autistic spectrum disorder as compared to healthy controls. Similarly, research has
repeatedly found decreased intentional mimicry for individuals with high autistic traits (for a
review, see [61]).
Based on the above-reviewed literature, it has been claimed that certain personality factors
influence imitation. That is, high empathic persons and high perspective-takers, individuals
with an interdependent self-construal, as well as people scoring low on autistic traits should
imitate others more strongly. However, the empirical evidence for this claim is less clear than
what has often been assumed. First, research on autism did not only find reduced automatic
imitation for individuals with high autistic traits, but also intact automatic imitation [62–64]
or even increased automatic imitation [65]. Second, some researchers were not able to repli-
cate the findings on the moderating role of empathy on imitation [54,66]. Third, although it is
claimed that self-construal moderates imitation, there is to the best of our knowledge no study
that actually showed self-construal as part of a personality trait to moderate imitation.
Present research
Taken together, the literature on imitation does not offer a clear answer to the question
whether mimicry and automatic imitation are correlated and to which degree personality traits
moderate imitation. Theoretical models on the mechanisms of imitation suggest that mimicry
and automatic imitation are linked to each other and that certain personality traits should
moderate mimicry and automatic imitation in the same way. However, some studies did not
find support for these moderating influences. Moreover, methodological differences between
mimicry and automatic imitation suggest that the two tasks might not be correlated. There-
fore, in the present research we tested for the first time whether mimicry and automatic imita-
tion are correlated and to which degree personality traits that have previously been linked to
mimicry and automatic imitation moderate both phenomena. To this end, we ran a highly
powered study with two hundred participants. To assess mimicry and automatic imitation, we
applied the most often reported tasks in the literature.
Method
Ethics statement
The study was conducted in accordance with the ethical standards of the 1964 Declaration of
Helsinki and approved by the rules of the Institutional Review Board from the Faculty of Psy-
chology and Educational Science of Ghent University. All participants provided informed con-
sent at the beginning of the experiment and were informed that participation was voluntary
and that all answers were processed and stored anonymously.
Data availability statement. The data file of the study is available from the Open Science
Framework database. The URL necessary to access our data is: https://osf.io/v3afy/.
Participants
In return for partial course credit, two hundred students from Ghent University (Belgium)
participated in this study. All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision and
hearing as well as confirmed to speak and comprehend Dutch. Prior to data analysis, we
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excluded two participants. One participant did not allow us to analyze her recorded videotape
and was thus excluded from all analyses. Another participant was excluded, because she mis-
understood the task. Moreover, two participants who had a mimicry score or a congruency
effect higher than 4 SD above the sample mean were identified as outliers and discharged as
well (note: leaving these outliers in the sample does not change the results). The reason why we
discharged these outliers is that the removal of outliers leads to more accurate correlations
between measures—that is they become closer to the population correlation (e.g., [67]). Thus,
the final sample contained 196 participants (135 women, 61 men) with an age ranging from 17
to 44 (M = 18.74; SD = 2.74).
Procedure
After being welcomed, participants were seated in separate cubicles. The setup of each cubicle
consisted of an Asus Eee PC 1215N laptop containing an integrated webcam, an external
17-inch Dell monitor, two speakers and an apple MB110FN/B AZERTY mac keyboard. Partic-
ipants sat at a viewing distance of approximately 35 cm to the monitor. After participants were
seated, they signed a written informed consent, and then ran through the mimicry and auto-
matic imitation task. The order of these two tasks was counterbalanced between participants.
Afterwards, participants filled in a couple of questionnaires measuring personality traits and
indicated demographic data. At the end, the experimenter fully debriefed participants.
Thereby, she told participants that they were videotaped during the experiment and asked
whether we were allowed to use the videos for scientific purposes. Finally, participants were
thanked and dismissed.
Materials/ Stimuli
Mimicry task. The mimicry task was an adaption of previously used video-based mimicry
tasks [e.g., 11-13,18,21,22,23,24-27]. Participants were told that they were going to watch two
video clips of a model reading a story and that they should listen carefully to the story as ques-
tions about the text had to be answered at the end of the experiment. Participants then watched
two video clips in which a female model read a story about a rabbit from the Dutch children
book titled “365 konijnenverhaaltjes voor het slapengaan (365 rabbit stories to go off to sleep)”
[68]. Each video lasted 10 minutes. In both videos, the model engaged in a specific action
every 20 seconds. That is, in one video she was touching her nose and in the other video she
was touching her hair (see Fig 1 for screenshots of the videos). The sequence of nose touching
versus hair touching videos was counterbalanced between participants. In line with the cover
story, participants had to answer ten story-related questions about the story after watching the
videos. Throughout the task, a webcam was used to videotape participants. In order to prepare
data for analyses, a coder blind to the conditions counted for each video how often participants
engaged in nose touching and hair stroking actions. To cross-validate the coding, a second
coder coded the videos of 50 randomly selected participants. The intra-class correlation coeffi-
cient was r = .77, p< .001.
Automatic imitation task. The automatic imitation task was based on Brass and col-
leagues’ [10] task and was programmed using Tscope5 software [69]. In the beginning of each
trial, participants were instructed to press down the ‘G’ and ‘H’ key with their right index and
middle finger. Then, a fixation cross appeared for 500 ms. Afterwards, a picture of a mirrored
left hand in resting position was presented for 200 ms. This picture was followed by a second
picture that was presented for a maximum of 2000 ms or until participants gave a response.
Depending on the condition, the picture either indicated an index finger movement, a middle
finger movement, or no movement. At the same time, a number was displayed between the
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model’s middle and index finger. Participants were instructed to lift their index finger as fast
as possible in response to the number ‘1’ and to lift their middle finger as fast as possible in
response to the number ‘2’ (see Fig 1 for an overview of the stimuli). This setup resulted in
three different trials: In congruent trials participants responded with the same finger as the
model, in incongruent trials participants responded with another finger than the model, and
in neutral trials the participants responded with a finger while the model did not respond at
all.
The automatic imitation task contained a practice and an experimental phase. The practice
phase contained 12 trials. The experimental phase contained 360 trials resulting in 120 congru-
ent trials, 120 incongruent trials and 120 neutral trials. In the experimental phase, participants
were allowed to take a break after every 90 trials. In order to reduce the influence of spatial
compatibility, participants were instructed to place their right hand rotated 90˚ counterclock-
wise to the model’s hand displayed on the screen (e.g., [70,71,72]).
To prepare the data for analysis, we removed extremely slow reaction times. That is, laten-
cies below (1.20%) and above (0.05%) 3 SD of the participants’ mean.
Personality scales. In order to test the degree to which personality traits that have previ-
ously been reported to moderate imitation correlate with mimicry and automatic imitation,
we administered a couple of questionnaires.
Perspective taking and empathy: To assess perspective taking and empathy, we adminis-
tered the Dutch version [73] of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; [52]). The IRI contains
28 items that were scored on 5-point rating scales ranging from 1 (does not describe me well) to
5 (describes me very well). The IRI is divided into four dimensions, each containing 7 items:
Besides Perspective Taking (Cronbach’s α = .68), it administers Fantasy (Cronbach’s α = .86),
Empathic Concern (Cronbach’s α = .64), and Personal Distress (Cronbach’s α = .79). In order
to prepare data for analyses, we computed mean scores of all subscales as well as a mean score
over all subscales in order to compute a total score of empathy (Cronbach’s α = .83).
Self- versus other focus: We assessed multiple scales to get insight into participants’ focus
on themselves versus others. First, we used a self-translated Dutch version of the Self-Con-
strual Scale (SCS; [74]). The SCS measures the strength of an individual’s interdependent and
Fig 1. Overview of incongruent, congruent and neutral trials in the automatic imitation task.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0183784.g001
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independent self-construal. These two self-construals are conceptualized as reflecting the
emphasis on connectedness and relations often found in non-Western cultures (interdepen-
dent) and the separateness and uniqueness of the individual (independent) stressed in Western
societies. The SCS contains 30 items, divided into an independence self-construal (Cronbach’s
α = .70) and an interdependence self-construal (Cronbach’s α = .72). Participants answered on
a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 7 (“strongly agree”) to which degree they
agreed to statements related to their self. In order to compute a total score of self-construal, we
subtracted the interdependence self-construal subscale from the independence self-construal
subscale. High values indicate a strong relative independence self-construal.
Second, we administered the Dutch version of the short Individualism and Collectivism
Scale (ICS; [75]). The shortened version of the ICS contains eight items, divided into four sub-
scales: Horizontal Individualism, Horizontal Collectivism, Vertical Individualism and Vertical
Collectivism. For individuals high on horizontal collectivism, the well-being of their in-groups
(e.g., family, tribe, coworkers, nation) is of central importance. However, they do not feel sub-
ordinate to their in-groups. In contrast, individuals high on vertical collectivism submit to the
norms of their in-groups and are even willing to sacrifice their personal identities for their in-
groups. Horizontal individualists, however, are characterized by seeking individuality rather
than distinctiveness by doing their own thing and not to compare themselves with others. Ver-
tical individualists are especially concerned with comparing themselves with others. That is,
they believe that competition is the law of nature, and they desire to win in all kinds of compe-
titions. Participants indicated on 7- point scales ranging from 1 (“definitely not true”) to 7
(“definitely true”) the degree to which the 8 statements apply to them. To compute a total score
of the scale, we subtracted the mean of the collectivism items (Cronbach’s α = .45) from the
mean of the individualism items (Cronbach’s α = .63). A high score reflects a relative high
individualism as compared to collectivism.
Third, we assessed participants’ need to belong. Need to belong refers to people’s desire for
interpersonal acceptance and belonging and is associated with greater sensitivity to interper-
sonal cues in order to foster connections with others [76]. In order to assess need to belong, we
applied a self translated Dutch version of the Need to Belong Scale (NTBS; [77]). Participants
indicated the degree to which each of the 10 statements applied to them on a 5-point scale (1 =
strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). Example items of the scale are “I try hard not to do things
that will make other people avoid or reject me,” and “I want other people to accept me.” Cron-
bach’s alpha for the NTBS was α = .85.
Autism-Spectrum Quotient. To assess a participant’s autistic-like traits, we used the Dutch
version [78] of the Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ; [79]). The AQ has been found to be
strongly predictive of who receives a diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder in a clinic setting
[80]. The AQ contains 50 items, divided into five subscales: social skill (Cronbach’s α = .66),
attention switching (Cronbach’s α = .56), communication (Cronbach’s α = .32), imagination
(Cronbach’s α = .63) and attention to detail (Cronbach’s α = .72). Participants answered on
5-point scales (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree) to which degree statements about them-
selves apply to them. The subscale scores were averaged into a single total score (Cronbach’s α
= .71).
Demographic data and further personality scales. Besides gender and age, we assessed
further scales that had not yet been tested to moderate mimicry and automatic imitation. That
is, we assessed participants’ engagement in social activities, socioeconomic status, number of
friends, learning styles and regulatory focus.
Social engagement. To assess social engagement, participants answered with yes or no
whether they had been engaging in the following social activities: “donating blood,” “registered
as stem cell donor,” “engagement in voluntary work,” “member of a charitable institution (e.g.,
Mimicry and automatic imitation
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UNICEF, Greenpeace, etc.),” and “donating for a charitable institution (e.g., UNICEF, Green-
peace, etc.).” In order to compute a total score we summed up the amount of yes-answers par-
ticipants gave on these items.
Socioeconomic status. We assessed participants’ objective as well as subjective socioeco-
nomic status (SES; [81]). To assess the subjective SES, participants responded to the following
six statements on a 5-point scale (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree): “My family usually
had enough money for things when I was growing up,” “I grew up in a relatively wealthy
neighborhood,” “I felt relatively wealthy compared to the other kids in my school,” “I have
enough money to buy things I want,” “I don’t worry too much about paying my bills,” “I don’t
think I’ll have to worry about money too much in the future.” Cronbach’s alpha for the mean
score of this subjective SES was α = .77.
To assess participants’ objective SES, they indicated on two 6-point scales (1= €1,000 or less;
2 = €1,001 - €2,000; 3 = €2001 - €3,000; 4 = €3,001 - €4,000; 5 = €4,001 - €5,000, 6 = more than
€5,000) their income per month: “What was your annual gross household income when you
were growing up? ,” “What is your present annual gross household income?” In addition, par-
ticipants indicated on three 10-point scales the following questions: “What is the highest edu-
cational level completed by your father?” “What is the highest educational level completed by
your mother?” “What is your highest educational level?”. To compute a total objective SES
score, we calculated the mean of all items. Cronbach’s alpha of the objective SES was α = .62.
Amount of friends: To have some further indication about participants’ social life, they
were asked how many friends they have. In addition, they also gave an estimation of their
number of Facebook friends, in case they had Facebook.
Learning style: With a self-translated Dutch version, we assessed participants’ learning
style [82]. The scale contained eight items, divided into four subscales: Active Learning, Con-
crete Experience, Reflective Observation, Abstract Conceptualization and Active Experimenta-
tion. All items were answered on a 5-point scale (1 = does not describe me well; 2 = describes me
very well).
Regulatory Focus: We also assessed participants’ regulatory focus. Regulatory Focus The-
ory [83] distinguishes between the promotion focus, which regulates nurturance needs and
goals related to aspiration and accomplishment (i.e., ideals), and the prevention focus, which
regulates security needs and goals related to safety and responsibilities (i.e., oughts). We
assessed the Dutch version (cf. [84]) of the 18-item regulatory focus scale developed by Lock-
wood et al. [85]. Participants indicated on 7-point scales (1 = definitively not true; 7 = defini-
tively true) how different promotion- and prevention-related statements apply to them. In line
with previous research [85–88], we computed a difference score by subtracting the score of the
prevention focus subscale (Cronbach’s α = .70) from the promotion focus subscale (Cron-
bach’s α = .67). High values indicate a relative strong promotion focus compared to a preven-
tion focus.
Results
To test our hypotheses we conducted inference statistics using SPSS. In addition, we
applied Bayesian statistics using JASP, an open source statistical package [89]. Specifically,
we report the Bayes factors (BF) calculated with the default JASP priors. BF10 gives the
ratio with which the alternative hypothesis is favored over the null hypothesis (i.e., larger
BFs argue in favor of the alternative hypothesis; see [90] for an overview), whereas BF01
gives the ratio with which the null hypothesis is favored over the alternative hypothesis
(i.e., a larger BFs argue in favor of the null hypothesis; see [90] for an overview). BF01 is
defined as the inverse of BF10.
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Mimicry
Mimicry. First, we ran a 2 (observed video: nose touching video vs. hair touching video) x
2 (performed action: nose touching action vs. hair touching action) repeated measures
ANOVA to test the presence of a mimicry effect. The ANOVA yielded no significant main
effects, F(1,195) < 1.54, p> .21. However, more importantly, we found a significant interac-
tion between observed video and performed action, F(1,195) = 11.69, p = .001, η2p= .06 indicat-
ing the presence of a substantial mimicry effect (see Fig 2 for means).
In an additional analysis, we calculated a nose-mimicry score by subtracting the amount of
nose touching actions in the hair video from the amount of nose touching actions in the nose
video. Likewise, we computed a hair-mimicry score by subtracting the amount of hair touch-
ing actions in the nose video from the amount of hair touching actions in the hair video. In
order to compute an overall mimicry score, we averaged the nose-mimicry score and the hair-
mimicry score. To test the strength of this mimicry effect, we then conducted a Bayesian t-test
in which we tested the hypothesis that the mimicry score (M =1.24; SD = 5.09) was larger than
0. The Bayesian t-test yielded BF10 = 43.12, indicating that the data is 43.12 times more likely
to have occurred under the alternative hypothesis than under the null hypothesis. A Bayes
factor< 100 and> 30 is conventionally considered to be very strong evidence [91].
Reliability. In a second analysis we tested the split-half reliability of the mimicry effect.
That is, we first computed two different mimicry scores. One score was calculated from the
even minutes and the other score was calculated from the odd minutes. In order to test the reli-
ability of the mimicry task, we computed the Spearman-Brown coefficient. The coefficient was
negative, ρ = -.11 suggesting non-reliability.
In an additional analysis we computed a mimicry score for hair actions and a mimicry
score for nose actions. The mimicry score for hair actions was computed by subtracting partic-
ipants’ hair actions during the nose video from participants’ hair actions in the hair video.
Likewise, the mimicry score for nose actions was computed by subtracting participants’ nose
actions in the hair video from participants’ nose actions in the nose video. The Spearman-
Brown coefficient for these two mimicry scores was negative, ρ = - .59, suggesting non-reli-
ability. This indicates that the low reliability is not restricted to one of the two actions. More-
over, we computed separately for even and odd minutes a nose-mimicry score and a hair-
mimicry score. Spearman-Brown coefficients were ρ =.13 for nose-mimicry and ρ =.15 for
hair-mimicry indicating low reliability.
Fig 2. Amount of performed actions in the mimicry task. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0183784.g002
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Automatic imitation
Latencies. Fig 3 illustrates the results for the latencies. With respect to the congruency
effect, the results indicated that individuals responded faster in congruent trials (M = 426.46,
SD = 36.78) than in incongruent trials (M = 472.64, SD = 51.78), t(195) = 21.83, p< .001,
d = 1.56. Similarly, the facilitation effect was significant. That is, participants responded faster
in congruent trials (M = 426.46, SD = 36.78) than in neutral trials (M = 451.45, SD = 40.52),
t(195) = 22.17, p< .001, d = 1.58. Moreover, the interference effect was significant suggesting
that participants responded faster in neutral trials (M = 451.45, SD = 40.52) than in incongru-
ent trials (M = 472.64, SD = 51.78), t(195) = 15.05, p< .001, d = 1.08.
In additional analyses, we tested the strength of the automatic imitation effects with Bayesian
t-tests. Specifically, we conducted Bayesian t-tests and tested the hypothesis that the congruency
effect (M = 46.19, SD = 29.62), the facilitation effect (M = 25.00, SD = 15.78), and the interference
effect (M = 21.19, SD = 19.71) were larger than 0. The Bayesian t-tests yielded BF10 = 1.181051
for the congruency effect, BF10 = 1.0110
52 for the facilitation effect and BF10 = 3.2210
31 for the
interference effect. A Bayes factor> 100 is conventionally considered to be extreme evidence
[91].
Error rates. As can be seen in Fig 4, the results for the error rates were in line with the
results for the latencies. That is, participants made fewer errors in congruent trials (M = 2.72%,
SD = 3.12), than in neutral trials (M = 3.29%, SD = 3.01), t(195) = 3.69, p< .001, dz = 0.26, and
in incongruent trials, (M = 7.07%, SD = 5.72), t(195) = 13.74, p< .001, d> 0.98. Moreover,
participants committed fewer errors in neutral trials (M = 3.29%, SD = 3.01) than in incongru-
ent trials (M = 7.07%, SD = 5.72), t(195) = 11.64, p< .001, d = 0.83.
Bayesian t-tests testing the hypothesis that the congruency effect (M = 4.34 SD = 4.43), the
facilitation effect (M = 0.57 SD = 2.17), and the interference effect (M =3.77 SD = 4.54) were
Fig 3. Mean reaction times of the automatic imitation task separated by condition. Error bars represent standard errors of
the mean.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0183784.g003
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larger than zero yielded BF10 = 3.6810
27 for the congruency effect, BF10 = 105.05 for the facili-
tation effect and BF10 = 1.9410
21 for the interference effect. A Bayes factor> 100 is considered
to be extreme evidence [91].
Reliability. In a further analysis, we tested the split-half reliability of the automatic imita-
tion task. First, we computed the congruency effect, the facilitation effect, and the interference
effect for even trials and for odd trials separately for reactions times and for error rates. Second,
we computed the Spearman-Brown coefficient in order to test the reliability of the automatic
imitation task. For reaction times, the results yielded ρ = .86 for the congruency effect, ρ = .50
for the facilitation effect, and ρ = .68 for the interference effect. For error rates, the results
yielded ρ = .61 for the congruency effect, ρ = .001 for the facilitation effect, and ρ = .62, for
the interference effect.
Relationship between mimicry and automatic imitation
To test the relationship between mimicry and automatic imitation, we ran correlational analy-
ses and will report both the corresponding p-values and BFs. In order to test the relationship
Fig 4. Mean error rates within the automatic imitation task separated by condition. Error bars represent
standard errors of the mean.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0183784.g004
Table 2. Intercorrelations between the mimicry score and all different automatic imitation scores.
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
1. Mimicry — -0.123 -0.096 -0.108 0.014 0.018 0.005
2. Congruency RT — 0.789 *** 0.871 *** 0.322 *** -0.019 0.323 ***
3. Facilitation RT — 0.385 *** 0.346*** -0.053 0.363 ***
4. Interference RT — 0.207** 0.014 0. 195 **
5. Congruency ER — 0.192 ** 0.883 ***
6. Facilitation ER — -0.290 ***
7. Interference ER —
* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001
Note. RT = Reaction Time; ER = Error Rate
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0183784.t002
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between mimicry and automatic imitation, we correlated the mimicry score with all the scores
of the automatic imitation task (i.e., congruency effect, facilitation effect, and interference
effect for reaction times as well as for error rates). However, none of the correlations involving
the mimicry score reached significance, r< - .13 p> .08 (for an overview of all correlations,
see Table 2). We then computed the BFs of all correlations to investigate whether the null
hypothesis (i.e., mimicry and automatic imitation are not positively correlated) could be sup-
ported. When correlating the mimicry score with the reaction time scores of the automatic
imitation task, the analyses yielded BF01 = 29.59 for the congruency effect, BF01 = 25.06 for the
facilitation effect, and BF01 = 27.15 for the interference effect. When correlating the mimicry
score with the error rates of the automatic imitation task, the analyses yielded BF01 = 9.51 for
the congruency effect, BF01 = 9.08 for the facilitation effect, and BF01 = 10.55 for the interfer-
ence effect. These results indicate moderate to strong evidence for the null hypothesis, which
confirms that mimicry and automatic imitation are not positively correlated (cf., [91]).
Relationship between personality traits and mimicry as well as automatic
imitation
In further correlation analyses, we tested whether mimicry and automatic imitation correlated
with the assessed personality traits and demographic data. That is, we ran three separate corre-
lational analyses. In the first analysis, we ran a correlation analysis between the mimicry score
and all assessed personality scales as well as demographic data. In the second analysis, we cor-
related all reaction-time-based scores from the automatic imitation task (i.e. congruency effect,
facilitation effect, and interference effect) with the assessed personality scales and demographic
data. Finally, in the third analysis, we calculated the same correlations for the error-rate-based
scores of the automatic imitation task. For each of the three correlational analyses, we cor-
rected for multiple comparisons by the means of FDR [92]. An overview of all the correlations
is provided in Table 3.
Relation between mimicry and personality scales as well as demographics. The correla-
tions between the mimicry score and the assessed personality scales did not yield any signifi-
cant results, r< .15, p> .99. Moreover, when testing the influence of gender on mimicry, an
independent sample t-test did not yield a significant effect either, t(194) = .81, p = .42.
Relation between automatic imitation and personality scales as well as demographics.
Firstly, we correlated the reaction-time-based scores of the automatic imitation task with all
assessed scales. The congruency effect correlated significantly with the Personality Distress
subscale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; [52]), r = .26, p = .02, but not with any
other scale (rs< .21, ps> .07). The facilitation effect did not correlate with any of the scales
either (rs< .22, ps> .07). Likewise, all correlations between the interference effect and the
assessed scales were non-significant (rs< .23, ps> .07).
Secondly, we tested for gender differences in the reaction-time-based imitation measures.
T-tests for independent samples detected stronger congruency effects and facilitation effects
for women (Mcongruency = 50.96, SDcongruency = 29.34; Mfacilitation = 28.19, SDfacilitation = 14.94)
than for men (Mcongruency = 35.61, SDcongruency = 27.63; Mfacilitation = 17.94, SDfacilitation = 15.42),
ts(194)> 3.45, ps< .002, ds> .53. Although not significant, there was a similar trend for the
interference effect t(194) = 1.69, p = .094.
Thirdly, we ran the same analyses for the error-based automatic imitation scores. However,
significant correlations were neither found for the congruency effect (r< .21, p> .22), nor for
the facilitation effect (r< .16, p> .46), nor for the interference effect (r< .20, p> .38). Also,
there was no gender difference for the congruency effect, the facilitation effect, or the interfer-
ence effect, ts(194)< 1.45, ps> .14.
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Discussion
When assessing individuals’ tendency to imitate others, researchers have been using different
tasks. While social psychologists assess mimicry, cognitive psychologists assess automatic imi-
tation. Both forms of imitation share similarities, but also differ in important aspects. Although
it is largely assumed that mimicry and automatic imitation are grounded in similar underlying
processes, the assessment of mimicry and automatic imitation differs in many methodological
aspects. This raises the fundamental question to which degree these two forms of imitation are
Table 3. Intercorrelations between all different imitation scores and all assessed scales and subscales.
Mimicry Congruency RT Facilitation RT Interference RT Congruency ER Facilitation ER Interference ER
IRI PT -0.114 -0.071 -0.036 -0.078 -0.084 0.007 -0.085
IRI FS 0.090 0.058 0.082 0.021 -0.050 0.043 -0.069
IRI EC 0.040 0.200**† 0.203**† 0.139 -0.029 0.055 -0.054
IRI PD 0.096 0.263***† 0.216** 0.222**† 0.127 -0.034 0.141*
IRI Total 0.059 0.174* 0.178* 0.119 -0.006 0.026 -0.018
SCS Independence -0.009 -0.055 -0.003 -0.081 -0.202** -0.012 -0.191**
SCS Interdependence 0.023 -0.161* -0.075 -0.182*† -0.119 0.043 -0.137
SCS Difference -0.023 0.078 0.053 0.075 -0.057 -0.040 -0.037
ICS Individualism -0.009 -0.080 -0.071 -0.063 -0.077 -0.081 -0.036
ICS Collectivism -0.002 -0.026 0.023 -0.058 -0.107 0.138 -0.170*
ICS Difference -0.007 -0.049 -0.073 -0.015 0.006 -0.156* 0.081
Need to Belong 0.000 0.136 0.089 0.133 0.077 0.012 0.069
AQ SS 0.031 -0.094 -0.057 -0.096 -0.121 0.007 -0.121
AQ AS 0.050 -0.067 -0.041 -0.068 -0.056 0.104 -0.104
AQ C -0.043 -0.051 -0.071 -0.020 -0.200** -0.128 -0.134
AQ I 0.040 0.062 0.064 0.042 -0.014 0.095 -0.059
AQ AD 0.003 0.147* 0.028 0.198**† 0.055 0.079 0.016
AQ Total -0.037 -0.067 -0.078 -0.038 -0.011 -0.090 0.032
Social Engagement 0.053 0.003 -0.020 0.021 -0.064 0.079 -0.100
Objective SES -0.030 0.115 -0.044 0.208**† 0.067 -0.045 0.086
Subjective SES 0.120 0.091 0.099 0.058 0.057 -0.069 0.089
Close Friends 0.097 -0.033 -0.129 0.054 -0.038 -0.087 0.004
Facebook Friends -0.035 0.021 0.028 0.009 0.140 0.137 0.072
LS CE 0.024 -0.103 -0.126 -0.054 -0.032 0.073 -0.066
LS RO 0.142* -0.126 -0.165* -0.057 -0.135 -0.078 -0.094
LS AC -0.070 -0.076 -0.060 -0.067 0.007 -0.033 0.022
LS AE -0.011 -0.083 -0.076 -0.064 -0.083 -0.057 -0.054
Promotion Focus -0.073 -0.036 -0.025 -0.035 0.014 0.071 -0.020
Prevention Focus -0.073 0.002 0.042 -0.031 0.055 0.069 0.020
RF Difference 0.005 -0.037 -0.068 -0.002 -0.044 -0.004 -0.041
* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001 for uncorrected multiple comparisons
†
= p < .10 for corrected multiple comparisons
Note. RT = Reaction Time; ER = Error Rate; PT = Perspective Taking; FS = Fantasy Scale; EC = Empathic Concern; PD = Personality Distress; SCS = Self-
Construal Scale; ICS = Individualism and Collectivism Scale; AQ = Autism-Spectrum Quotient; SS = Social Skill; AS = Attention Switching;
C = Communication; I = Imagination; AD = Attention to Detail; SES = Socioeconomic Status; LS = Learning Style; CE = Concrete Experience;
RO = Reflective Observation; AC =Abstract Conceptualization; AE = Active Experimentation; RF = Regulatory Focus
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0183784.t003
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actually correlated to each other. In order to shed light on this open question, we measured
mimicry as well as automatic imitation and correlated these two tasks. Moreover, we tested the
relation of personality scales that have previously been reported to correlate with imitation (i.e.
empathy, autism-like personality traits, traits related to self- versus other-focus), scales that
have not yet been reported in the literature (i.e., regulatory focus, learning style) as well as
demographics (i.e., gender, socioeconomic status, social engagement, amount of friends).
In line with past research, we detected significant imitation as well as mimicry effects. How-
ever, we did not find a significant correlation between the two tasks. This was further sup-
ported by Bayesian analyses showing that mimicry and automatic imitation were indeed not
correlated. In addition, none of the assessed personality scales correlated with mimicry or
automatic imitation in a meaningful way. When controlling for multiple comparisons, there
was only one single significant relation, namely a correlation between the reaction time based
congruency effect and the Personality Distress subscale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index
(IRI; [52]).
The absence of a correlation between mimicry and automatic imitation might be due to dif-
ferent reasons. First, it could be caused by differences in the methodological setup of the two
paradigms. While automatic imitation is measured trial-by-trial, is based on reaction times or
error rates, elicits awareness in participants, and needs explicit cognitive control, mimicry is
based on behavioral observations, is rather subjectively detected, remains unaware for partici-
pants, and does not need explicit cognitive control. Although mimicry and automatic imita-
tion did not correlate with each other, we do not argue that these two constructs are not
related to each other at all. Rather, we suggest that both paradigms are part of the same con-
struct (i.e., imitation), but measure different aspects of it. That is, while mimicry measures imi-
tation in a social context, automatic imitation measures imitation in a laboratory context
instead (for a similar distinction see [28]).
Second, another reason for the missing correlation could be found in the reliability of the
two tasks. While the automatic imitation task produced good reliability, the mimicry task was
not reliable at all. It is important to note that in line with past research on the mimicry task
(e.g., [6,19,27]), the inter-judge reliability of coded actions was high in our study. However,
as far as we know, we measured for the first time the actual reliability of the mimicry task—
that is the internal consistency of mimicry performance between odd and even minutes—and
detected very low reliability. Psychometric theory has shown that unreliable tasks are less likely
to correlate with other tasks (cf., [93,94]). Thus, it might well be that mimicry and automatic
imitation are strongly linked to each other, but that the low reliability of the mimicry task
reduces the likelihood to detect such a relation. Despite the low reliability, it is important to
note, however, that a reduced reliability does not necessarily indicate that the task is not repli-
cable (e.g., [95]). Indeed, mimicry tasks have been replicated numerous times by different
researchers in different labs (for an overview see [30]).
Since past research has not reported internal consistency of mimicry performance, we do
not know how reliable mimicry tasks are in general. But, if mimicry tasks are indeed rather
unreliable, one should interpret past correlations of this task with caution. Future research
may, thus, consider other tasks that assess mimicry with multiple trials in order to achieve
higher internal consistency. For example, one could use tasks that measure mimicry of facial
expression. It has been found that such tasks have good sensitivity to ASD related behaviors
[96], and are sensitive to social variables [97].
The second finding that most of the assessed personality scales did not correlate with mim-
icry and automatic imitation in a meaningful way may be surprising. There might be different
reasons for such a finding. First, given that unreliable tasks are less likely to correlate with
other constructs (cf., [93,94]), it should be not surprising that mimicry did not correlate with
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any of the assessed personality scales. Moreover, since some of the assessed scales were not
very reliable either, it is also not surprising that we did not find more significant results. Sec-
ond, it might be that controlling for multiple comparisons reduced statistical power and as
such masked some potential effects. Indeed, when not controlling for multiple comparisons,
some correlations were significant. It is important to note, however, that all correlation coeffi-
cients were very low (i.e., rs< .27). Since irrelevant effects can become significant with large
samples (e.g., [98,99]), one should be careful not to overinterpret such low correlations. Third,
it might be that the assessed scales actually do not correlate with imitation. This interpretation
is in line with other recent studies that did not find significant relations between imitation and
different personality scales either. For instance, Butler and Ramsey [66] did not find a relation
between automatic imitation and extraversion, agreeableness, disorders of social cognition
(i.e., autistic-like and schizotypal traits), narcissism, and empathy. A crucial difference between
studies that found a relation with personality scales and studies that did not is the sample size.
While previous studies used rather low numbers of participants, we, but also Butler and Ram-
sey [66], aimed for high power. As underpowered studies in combination with publication
bias increase the likelihood of false positives (e.g., [99]), one should regard previous findings
suggesting a relation between personality traits and imitation with caution.
Moreover, the finding that the automatic imitation task does not correlate with mimicry
and most social related personality traits raises the question to which degree automatic imita-
tion actually taps into social processes. While previous research suggests that automatic imita-
tion relates to social factors such as eye contact [100], social attitudes [101], human-like
actions (e.g., [102,103]), or a pro-social focus [57–59,101,104,105], there are also a few studies
that do not support this view. For instance, some studies did not find increased automatic imi-
tation in human as compared to non-human agents (e.g., [54,106,107]). Moreover, Butler and
Ramesey [66] did not find a relationship between social components of personality traits and
automatic imitation. Likewise, some researchers did not find reduced automatic imitation in
individuals with autism [62–64]. Finally, Farmer et al. [108] did not find an influence of social
status and power on automatic imitation. Thus, in light of these contradictory findings, more
research is needed in order to draw specific conclusions about the degree to which social fac-
tors facilitate automatic imitation.
Despite the lack of correlations, there are some other findings that merit further discussion.
First, we found a significant correlation between the reaction-time-based congruency effect
and the Personality Distress subscale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; [52]). While
this finding goes in line with other research suggesting a positive relationship between auto-
matic imitation and empathy [47–49], our effect should be interpreted with caution because
this relation was only significant between one subscale of the IRI and one automatic imitation
score. Second, when not controlling for multiple comparisons, some correlations between
automatic imitation and the assessed personality scales would actually have correlated signifi-
cantly. Although due to our large sample size [98,99] the correlations that were significant at
the uncorrected level should be regarded with caution, future research may follow up these
correlations in order to test to which degree they are nonetheless reliable. Third, we found a
significant gender difference in automatic imitation with female participants showing stronger
automatic imitation effects than male participants. While this finding is in line with previous
studies (e.g., [66]), it raises the question of why this is the case. It might well be that differences
in personality traits account for this difference. However, personality traits including empathy,
autism-spectrum quotient, and traits related to self- versus other-focus cannot explain the sex-
difference, as we did not find a relation between these traits and the automatic imitation task.
Thus, future research may test other personality traits that are more prone to sex-differences.
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Limitations
First, it is possible that our null results could be explained by the quality of the assessed scales.
Indeed, some subscales had rather low reliability. However, most scales that have been previ-
ously found to correlate with imitation (i.e., perspective taking, self-construal, autism total
scale) had an overall good reliability. Moreover, all measures that were used had been validated
and are well established in the literature. Nevertheless, future research should use additional
scales and scales with more reliable long-formats.
Second, one could argue that automatic imitation in the current study was confounded
with spatial compatibility. To control for left-right spatial compatibility, we used a well-known
method in which the stimulus hand is presented orthogonal to the response hand (e.g.,
[70,71,72]). Nevertheless, a potential concern with this method is that it fails to control for
orthogonal spatial compatibility [109]. As a result, it is possible that orthogonal spatial pro-
cesses introduced noise to the data that in turn masked potential correlations. Given that auto-
matic imitation can still be observed even when spatial processes cannot contribute [28],
future research should use tasks that control not only left-right, but also orthogonal spatial
compatibility [110] in order to reduce noise in the data and as such increase statistical power.
Third, as it is common in psychological research, most of our participants were female.
Although 61 male subjects is atypically high for psychological research, it may still be that
the lower percentage of men, as compared to women, reduced the variability within the
tasks causing null effects. In a related vein, it is important to note that all of our subjects
were young psychology students. This, again, may have caused low levels of variance within
the tasks, increasing the likelihood of finding null effects. Future research should, thus, aim
at assessing more intermixed samples.
Conclusion
The present study provides novel insights into the understanding of imitation. First, we found
no relationship between mimicry and automatic imitation suggesting that, despite similar
underlying mechanisms, the two forms of imitation are less related to each other than initially
suggested. Second, we did not find meaningful relationships between any form of imitation
and most personality traits including empathy, autism-like personality traits, and traits related
to self- versus other-focus. Therefore, we suggest in line with other research (i.e., [66]) that the
relationship between social components of personality traits and imitation is less universal
than previously reported in the literature. As previous studies on the relation between person-
ality traits and imitation tested their predictions on rather low numbers of participants, our
research stresses the importance to study larger samples in order to replicate and extend previ-
ously established findings.
Author Contributions
Conceptualization: Oliver Genschow, Lara Bardi, Davide Rigoni, Marcel Brass.
Data curation: Sofie van Den Bossche.
Formal analysis: Oliver Genschow, Emiel Cracco.
Funding acquisition: Oliver Genschow.
Investigation: Sofie van Den Bossche.
Methodology: Oliver Genschow, Sofie van Den Bossche, Emiel Cracco.
Project administration: Oliver Genschow, Sofie van Den Bossche.
Mimicry and automatic imitation
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0183784 September 6, 2017 16 / 21
Resources: Oliver Genschow.
Supervision: Oliver Genschow, Lara Bardi, Davide Rigoni, Marcel Brass.
Writing – original draft: Oliver Genschow, Sofie van Den Bossche, Emiel Cracco, Lara Bardi,
Davide Rigoni, Marcel Brass.
Writing – review & editing: Oliver Genschow, Sofie van Den Bossche, Emiel Cracco.
References
1. Dimberg U (1982) Facial reactions to facial expressions. Psychophysiology 19: 643–647. PMID:
7178381
2. Cappella JN, Planalp S (1981) Talk and silence sequences in informal conversations III: Interspeaker
influence. Human Communication Research 7: 117–132.
3. Giles H, Powesland PF, editors (1975) Speech style and social evaluation. London: Academic Press.
4. Webb JT (1969) Subject speed rates as a function of interviewer behavior. Language & Speech 12:
54–67.
5. Webb JT (1972) Interview synchrony: An investigation of two speech rate measures in an automated
standardized interview. In: Pope B, Siegman AW, editors. Studies in dyadic communication. New
York: Pergamon. pp. 115–133.
6. Chartrand TL, Bargh JA (1999) The chameleon effect: The perception-behavior link and social interac-
tion. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology 76: 893–910.
7. LaFrance M (1982) Posture mirroring and rapport. In: Davis M, editor. Interaction rhythms: Periodicity
in communicative behavior. New York: Human Sciences Press. pp. 279–298.
8. Bernieri FJ (1988) Coordinated movement and rapport in teacher-student interactions. Journal of Non-
verbal Behavior 12: 120–138.
9. Hansen J, Alves H, Trope Y (in press) Psychological Distance Reduces Literal Imitation: Evidence
From an Imitation-Learning Paradigm. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and
Performance.
10. Brass M, Bekkering H, Wohlschla¨ger A, Prinz W (2000) Compatibility between observed and executed
finger movements: comparing symbolic, spatial, and imitative cues. Brain and Cognition 44: 124–143.
https://doi.org/10.1006/brcg.2000.1225 PMID: 11041986
11. Genschow O, Florack A (2014) Attention on the Source of Influence Reverses the Impact of Cross-
Contextual Imitation. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 40:
904–907. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0035430 PMID: 24446718
12. Genschow O, Florack A, Wa¨nke M (2013) The power of movement: Evidence for context-independent
movement imitation. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 142: 763–773.
13. Genschow O, Schindler S (2016) The influence of group membership on cross-contextual imitation.
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 23: 1257–1265.
14. Hofree G, Urgen BA, Winkielman P, Saygin AP (2015) Observation and imitation of actions performed
by humans, androids, and robots: an EMG study. Frontiers in human neuroscience 9.
15. Kavanagh LC, Winkielman P (2016) The Functionality of Spontaneous Mimicry and Its Influences on
Affiliation: An Implicit Socialization Account. Frontiers in Psychology 7: 458. https://doi.org/10.3389/
fpsyg.2016.00458 PMID: 27064398
16. van Baaren R, Janssen L, Chartrand TL, Dijksterhuis A (2009) Where is the love? The social aspects
of mimicry. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 364: 2381–2389.
17. van Baaren R, Holland RW, Steenaert B, Van Knippenberg A (2003) Mimicry for money: Behavioral
consequences of imitation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 39: 393–398.
18. Lakin JL, Chartrand TL (2003) Using nonconscious behavioral mimicry to create affiliation and rapport.
Psychological Science 14: 334–339. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9280.14481 PMID: 12807406
19. Lakin JL, Chartrand TL, Arkin RM (2008) I am too just like you - Nonconscious mimicry as an auto-
matic behavioral response to social exclusion. Psychological Science 19: 816–822. https://doi.org/10.
1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02162.x PMID: 18816290
20. Ml Stel, Blascovich J, McCall C, Mastop J, Van Baaren RB, Vonk R (2010) Mimicking disliked others:
Effects of a priori liking on the mimicry-liking link. European Journal of Social Psychology 40: 867–
880.
Mimicry and automatic imitation
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0183784 September 6, 2017 17 / 21
21. Stel M, van Baaren RB, Blascovich J, van Dijk E, McCall C, Pollmann MM, et al. (2010) Effects of a pri-
ori liking on the elicitation of mimicry. Experimental Psychology 57: 412–418. https://doi.org/10.1027/
1618-3169/a000050 PMID: 20178935
22. van Baaren RB, Horgan TG, Chartrand TL, Dijkmans M (2004) The forest, the trees, and the chame-
leon: context dependence and mimicry. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 86: 453–459.
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.86.3.453 PMID: 15008648
23. Genschow O, Brass M (2015) The predictive chameleon: Evidence for anticipated action. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 41: 265–268. https://doi.org/10.1037/
xhp0000035 PMID: 25665086
24. Gueguen N, Martin A, Vion M (2009) The effects of incidental similarity between two individuals on
mimicry behavior. PSYCHOLOGIE FRANCAISE 54: 337–353.
25. Hall NR, Millings A, Bouc¸as SB (2012) Adult attachment orientation and implicit behavioral mimicry.
Journal of Nonverbal Behavior 36: 235–247.
26. van Baaren RB, Fockenberg DA, Holland RW, Janssen L, van Knippenberg A (2006) The moody cha-
meleon: The effect of mood on non-conscious mimicry. Social Cognition 24: 426–437.
27. Yabar Y, Johnston L, Miles L, Peace V (2006) Implicit behavioral mimicry: Investigating the impact of
group membership. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior 30: 97–113.
28. Heyes C (2011) Automatic imitation. Psychological Bulletin 137: 463–483. https://doi.org/10.1037/
a0022288 PMID: 21280938
29. Brass M, Bekkering H, Prinz W (2001) Movement observation affects movement execution in a simple
response task. Acta Psychologica 106: 3–22. PMID: 11256338
30. Chartrand TL, Dalton AN (2009) Mimicry: Its ubiquity, importance, and functionality. In: Morales E,
Gollwitzer PM, Bargh JA, editors. The psychology of action: Vol 2 Mechanisms of human action:
Oxford University Press. pp. 893–910.
31. van Leeuwen ML, van Baaren RB, Martin D, Dijksterhuis A, Bekkering H (2009) Executive functioning
and imitation: Increasing working memory load facilitates behavioural imitation. Neuropsychologia 47:
3265–3270. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.06.005 PMID: 19538976
32. Greenwald AG (1970) Sensory feedback mechanisms in performance control: With special reference
to the ideo-motor mechanism. Psychological Review 77: 73–99. PMID: 5454129
33. Jeannerod M, Arbib MA, Rizzolatti G, Sakata H (1995) Grasping objects: the cortical mechanisms of
visuomotor transformatio. Trends Neurosci 18: 314–320. PMID: 7571012
34. Prinz W (1990) A common coding approach to perception and action. In: Neumann O, Prinz W, edi-
tors. Relationships between perception and action. Berlin: Springer-Verlag. pp. 167–201.
35. Prinz W (1997) Perception and action planning. European journal of cognitive psychology 9: 129–
154.
36. Chartrand TL, Maddux WW, Lakin JL (2005) Beyond the perception-behavior link: The ubiquitous util-
ity and motivational moderators of nonconscious mimicry. In: Hassin R, Uleman J, Bargh JA, editors.
Unintended thoughts 2: The new unconscious. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 334–361.
37. Dijksterhuis A, Bargh JA (2001) The perception-behavior expressway: Automatic effects of social per-
ception on social behavior. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 33: 1–40.
38. Dijksterhuis A, Chartrand TL, Aarts H (2005) The relation between perception and motivation. In:
Bargh JA, editor. Handbook of automaticity. Philadelphia: Psychology Press. pp. 207–222.
39. Craighero L, Bello A, Fadiga L, Rizzolatti G (2002) Hand action preparation influences the responses
to hand pictures. Neuropsychologia 40: 492–502. PMID: 11749979
40. Kilner J, Paulignan Y, Blakemore S (2003) An interference effect of observed biological movement on
action. Current Biology 13: 522–525. PMID: 12646137
41. Gazzola V, Keysers C (2009) The observation and execution of actions share motor and somatosen-
sory voxels in all tested subjects: single-subject analyses of unsmoothed fMRI data. Cerebral Cortex
19: 1239–1255. https://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bhn181 PMID: 19020203
42. Keysers C, Gazzola V (2010) Social neuroscience: mirror neurons recorded in humans. Current Biol-
ogy 20: 353–354. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2009.12.050
43. Catmur C, Walsh V, Heyes C (2007) Sensorimotor learning configures the human mirror system. Cur-
rent Biology 17: 1527–1531. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2007.08.006 PMID: 17716898
44. Fadiga L, Fogassi L, Pavesi G, Rizzolatti G (1995) Motor facilitation during action observation: a mag-
netic stimulation study. Journal of Neurophysiology 73: 2608–2611. PMID: 7666169
45. Di Pellegrino G, Fadiga L, Fogassi L, Gallese V, Rizzolatti G (1992) Understanding motor events: a
neurophysiological study. Experimental Brain Research 91: 176–180. PMID: 1301372
Mimicry and automatic imitation
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0183784 September 6, 2017 18 / 21
46. Mukamel R, Ekstrom AD, Kaplan J, Iacoboni M, Fried I (2010) Single-neuron responses in humans
during execution and observation of actions. Current biology 20: 750–756. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
cub.2010.02.045 PMID: 20381353
47. Mu¨ller BC, Leeuwen ML, Baaren RB, Bekkering H, Dijksterhuis A (2013) Empathy is a beautiful thing:
Empathy predicts imitation only for attractive others. Scandinavian journal of psychology 54: 401–
406. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjop.12060 PMID: 23786165
48. Sonnby-Borgstro¨m M, Jo¨nsson P, Svensson O (2003) Emotional empathy as related to mimicry reac-
tions at different levels of information processing. Journal of Nonverbal behavior 27: 3–23.
49. Sonnby–Borgstro¨m M (2002) Automatic mimicry reactions as related to differences in emotional
empathy. Scandinavian journal of psychology 43: 433–443. PMID: 12500783
50. Jackson PL, Meltzoff AN, Decety J (2006) Neural circuits involved in imitation and perspective-taking.
Neuroimage 31: 429–439. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2005.11.026 PMID: 16406257
51. Lamm C, Batson CD, Decety J (2007) The neural substrate of human empathy: Effects of perspec-
tive-taking and cognitive appraisal. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 19: 42–58. https://doi.org/10.
1162/jocn.2007.19.1.42 PMID: 17214562
52. Davis MH (1980) A multidimensional approach to individual differences in empathy. JSAS Catalog of
Selected Documents in Psychology 10: 85.
53. Horton WS (2014) Individual differences in perspective taking and field-independence mediate struc-
tural persistence in dialog. Acta psychologica 150: 41–48. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.actpsy.2014.04.
006 PMID: 24816270
54. Cracco E, De Coster L, Andres M, Brass M (2015) Motor simulation beyond the dyad: Automatic imita-
tion of multiple actors. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 41:
1488–1501, Empathy results retrieved from osf.io/eas1484m. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0039737
PMID: 26389616
55. Cracco E, Brass M (2017, May 29) Motor simulation beyond the dyad: Automatic imitation of multiple
actors. Retrieved from osfio/eas4m
56. Brewer MB (1991) The social self: On being the same and different at the same time. Personality and
social psychology bulletin 17: 475–482.
57. van Baaren RB, Maddux WW, Chartrand TL, De Bouter C, van Knippenberg A (2003) It takes two to
mimic: behavioral consequences of self-construals. Journal of personality and social psychology 84:
1093–1102. PMID: 12757151
58. Hogeveen J, Obhi SS (2011) Altogether now: activating interdependent self-construal induces hyper-
motor resonance. Cognitive neuroscience 2: 74–82. https://doi.org/10.1080/17588928.2010.533164
PMID: 24168476
59. Spengler S, Brass M, Ku¨hn S, Schu¨tz-Bosbach S (2010) Minimizing motor mimicry by myself: self-
focus enhances online action-control mechanisms during motor contagion. Consciousness and cogni-
tion 19: 98–106. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2009.12.014 PMID: 20116291
60. Cook J, Swapp D, Pan X, Bianchi-Berthouze N, Blakemore S-J (2014) Atypical interference effect of
action observation in autism spectrum conditions. Psychological medicine 44: 731–740. https://doi.
org/10.1017/S0033291713001335 PMID: 23759288
61. Williams JH, Whiten A, Singh T (2004) A systematic review of action imitation in autistic spectrum dis-
order. Journal of autism and developmental disorders 34: 285–299. PMID: 15264497
62. Bird G, Leighton J, Press C, Heyes C (2007) Intact automatic imitation of human and robot actions in
autism spectrum disorders. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences 274:
3027–3031.
63. Gowen E, Stanley J, Miall R (2008) Movement interference in autism-spectrum disorder. Neuropsy-
chologia 46: 1060–1068. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2007.11.004 PMID: 18096192
64. Press C, Richardson D, Bird G (2010) Intact imitation of emotional facial actions in autism spectrum
conditions. Neuropsychologia 48: 3291–3297. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2010.07.
012 PMID: 20638398
65. Spengler S, Bird G, Brass M (2010) Hyperimitation of actions is related to reduced understanding of
others’ minds in autism spectrum conditions. Biological Psychiatry 68: 1148–1155. https://doi.org/10.
1016/j.biopsych.2010.09.017 PMID: 21130224
66. Butler EE, Ward R, Ramsey R (2015) Investigating the Relationship between Stable Personality Char-
acteristics and Automatic Imitation. PloS one 10: e0129651. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.
0129651 PMID: 26079137
67. Osborne JW, Overbay A (2004) The power of outliers (and why researchers should always check for
them). Practical assessment, research & evaluation 9: 1–12.
Mimicry and automatic imitation
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0183784 September 6, 2017 19 / 21
68. Frohlich F, Vogl C (2010) 365 dierenverhaaltjes - Konijnen. Noordwijkerhout, Netherlands: Rebo
Productions.
69. Stevens M, Lammertyn J, Verbruggen F, Vandierendonck A (2006) Tscope: AC library for program-
ming cognitive experiments on the MS Windows platform. Behavior Research Methods 38: 280–286.
PMID: 16956104
70. Cook J, Bird G (2011) Social attitudes differentially modulate imitation in adolescents and adults.
Experimental Brain Research 211: 601–612. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00221-011-2584-4 PMID:
21336831
71. Cook JL, Bird G (2012) Atypical social modulation of imitation in autism spectrum conditions. Journal
of autism and developmental disorders 42: 1045–1051. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-011-1341-7
PMID: 21833823
72. Jime´nez L, Recio S, Me´ndez A, Lorda MJ, Permuy B, Me´ndez C (2012) Automatic imitation and spa-
tial compatibility in a key-pressing task. Acta psychologica 141: 96–103. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
actpsy.2012.07.007 PMID: 22864312
73. De Corte K, Buysse A, Verhofstadt LL, Roeyers H, Ponnet K, Davis MH (2007) Measuring empathic
tendencies: Reliability and validity of the Dutch version of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index. Psycholo-
gica Belgica 47: 235–260.
74. Singelis TM (1994) The measurement of independent and interdependent self-construals. Personality
and social psychology bulletin 20: 580–591.
75. Triandis HC, Gelfand MJ (1998) Converging measurement of horizontal and vertical individualism and
collectivism. Journal of personality and social psychology 74: 118–128.
76. Pickett CL, Gardner WL, Knowles M (2004) Getting a cue: The need to belong and enhanced sensitiv-
ity to social cues. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 30: 1095–1107. https://doi.org/10.1177/
0146167203262085 PMID: 15359014
77. Leary MR, Kelly KM, Cottrell CA, Schreindorfer LS (2013) Construct validity of the need to belong
scale: Mapping the nomological network. Journal of personality assessment 95: 610–624. https://doi.
org/10.1080/00223891.2013.819511 PMID: 23905716
78. Hoekstra RA, Bartels M, Cath DC, Boomsma DI (2008) Factor structure, reliability and criterion validity
of the Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ): a study in Dutch population and patient groups. Journal of
autism and developmental disorders 38: 1555–1566. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-008-0538-x
PMID: 18302013
79. Baron-Cohen S, Wheelwright S, Skinner R, Martin J, Clubley E (2001) The autism-spectrum quotient
(AQ): Evidence from asperger syndrome/high-functioning autism, malesand females, scientists and
mathematicians. Journal of autism and developmental disorders 31: 5–17. PMID: 11439754
80. Woodbury-Smith MR, Robinson J, Wheelwright S, Baron-Cohen S (2005) Screening adults for Asper-
ger syndrome using the AQ: A preliminary study of its diagnostic validity in clinical practice. Journal of
autism and developmental disorders 35: 331–335. PMID: 16119474
81. Griskevicius V, Tybur JM, Delton AW, Robertson TE (2011) The influence of mortality and socioeco-
nomic status on risk and delayed rewards: a life history theory approach. Journal of personality and
social psychology 100: 1015–1026. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0022403 PMID: 21299312
82. Kolb DA (2014) Experiential learning: Experience as the source of learning and development. In:
Sternberg RJ, Zhang LF, editors. Perspectives on cognitive, learning, and thinking styles. NJ: Law-
rence Erlbaum.
83. Higgins ET (1997) Beyond pleasure and pain. American psychologist 52: 1280–1300. PMID:
9414606
84. Pfattheicher S, Sassenrath C (2014) A regulatory focus perspective on eating behavior: how preven-
tion and promotion focus relates to emotional, external, and restrained eating. Frontiers in psychology
5.
85. Lockwood P, Jordan CH, Kunda Z (2002) Motivation by positive or negative role models: regulatory
focus determines who will best inspire us. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 83: 854–864.
PMID: 12374440
86. Pennington GL, Roese NJ (2003) Regulatory focus and temporal distance. Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology 39: 563–576.
87. Shah J, Higgins T, Friedman RS (1998) Performance incentives and means: how regulatory focus
influences goal attainment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 74: 285–293. PMID:
9491583
88. Uskul AK, Sherman DK, Fitzgibbon J (2009) The cultural congruency effect: Culture, regulatory focus,
and the effectiveness of gain-vs. loss-framed health messages. Journal of Experimental Social Psy-
chology 45: 535–541.
Mimicry and automatic imitation
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0183784 September 6, 2017 20 / 21
89. Love J, Selker R, Marsman M, Jamil T, Dropmann D, Verhagen A, et al. (2015) JASP (Version 0.7)
[Computer software]. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: JASP Project. Retrieved from https://jasp-stats.
org.
90. Dienes Z (2011) Bayesian versus orthodox statistics: Which side are you on? Perspectives on Psy-
chological Science 6: 274–290. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691611406920 PMID: 26168518
91. Jeffreys H (1961) Theory of probability. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
92. Benjamini Y, Hochberg Y (1995) Controlling the false discovery rate: a practical and powerful
approach to multiple testing. Journal of the royal statistical society Series B (Methodological): 289–
300.
93. Crocker L, Algina J (1986) Introduction to classical and modern test theory. Fort Worth, TX: Holt,
Rinehart, & Winston.
94. Cronbach LJ (1990) Essentials of psychological testing ( 5th ed.). New York: Harper & Row.
95. De Schryver M, Hughes S, Rosseel Y, De Houwer J (2015) Unreliable Yet Still Replicable: A Comment
on LeBel and Paunonen (2011). Frontiers in psychology 6.
96. McIntosh DN (2006) Spontaneous facial mimicry, liking and emotional contagion. Polish Psychological
Bulletin 37: 31–42.
97. Hess U, Fischer A (2013) Emotional mimicry as social regulation. Personality and Social Psychology
Review 17: 142–157. https://doi.org/10.1177/1088868312472607 PMID: 23348982
98. Cohen J (1969) Statistical power analysis for the behavioural sciences. New York: Academic Press.
99. Lakens D, Evers ER (2014) Sailing from the seas of chaos into the corridor of stability practical recom-
mendations to increase the informational value of studies. Perspectives on Psychological Science 9:
278–292. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691614528520 PMID: 26173264
100. Wang Y, Newport R, Hamilton AFdC (2011) Eye contact enhances mimicry of intransitive hand move-
ments. Biology Letters: 7–10. https://doi.org/10.1098/rsbl.2010.0279 PMID: 20427328
101. Leighton J, Bird G, Orsini C, Heyes C (2010) Social attitudes modulate automatic imitation. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology 46: 905–910.
102. Liepelt R, Brass M (2010) Top-down modulation of motor priming by belief about animacy. Experimen-
tal Psychology 57: 221–227. https://doi.org/10.1027/1618-3169/a000028 PMID: 20178950
103. Longo MR, Bertenthal BI (2009) Attention modulates the specificity of automatic imitation to human
actors. Experimental Brain Research 192: 739–744. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00221-008-1649-5
PMID: 19034438
104. Leighton J, Bird G, Charman T, Heyes C (2008) Weak imitative performance is not due to a functional
‘mirroring’deficit in adults with Autism Spectrum Disorders. Neuropsychologia 46: 1041–1049. https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2007.11.013 PMID: 18177677
105. Wang Y, Hamilton A (2013) Understanding the role of the ‘self’in the social priming of mimicry. PloS
one 8: e60249. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0060249 PMID: 23565208
106. Jansson E, Wilson AD, Williams JH, Mon-Williams M (2007) Methodological problems undermine
tests of the ideo-motor conjecture. Experimental Brain Research 182: 549–558. https://doi.org/10.
1007/s00221-007-1013-1 PMID: 17593359
107. Klapper A, Ramsey R, Wigboldus D, Cross ES (2014) The control of automatic imitation based on Bot-
tom–Up and Top–Down cues to animacy: Insights from brain and behavior. Journal of cognitive neuro-
science 26: 2503–2513. https://doi.org/10.1162/jocn_a_00651 PMID: 24742157
108. Farmer H, Carr EW, Svartdal M, Winkielman P, Hamilton AFdC (2016) Status and power do not modu-
late automatic imitation of intransitive hand movements. PloS one 11: e0151835. https://doi.org/10.
1371/journal.pone.0151835 PMID: 27096167
109. Weeks DJ, Proctor RW (1990) Salient-features coding in the translation between orthogonal stimulus
and response dimensions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 119: 355–366.
110. Catmur C, Heyes C (2011) Time course analyses confirm independence of imitative and spatial com-
patibility. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 37: 409–421.
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0019325 PMID: 20731523
Mimicry and automatic imitation
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0183784 September 6, 2017 21 / 21
